Botella, C. (1) Baños, R.M.(2) & Alcañiz, M. (3)
(1) Universitat Jaume I (Spain)
(2) Universitat de Valencia (Spain)
(3) Universidad Politécnica de Valencia (Spain)
Address contact:
Cristina Botella, Ph.D.
Dpto. Psicología Básica, Clínica y Psicobiología
Campus de Riu Sec
Castellón (Spain)
e-mail: botella@psb.uji.es
Phone: + 34 964 72 80 00
Biocca (2003) pointed out that research on presence has been carried out from the perspective of a two poles psychological model: the user is present in the physical space or in the virtual world. From this perspective, it has been stated that the central aspects in presence were technological, and technology was given priority. Thus the technological aspects were the necessary and sufficient factors to activate presence in the user. But currently there exists an extensive acknowledgement about the convenience of considering presence as a psychological phenomenon (Schubert, Friedman and Regenbrecht, 2001). For example, according to Slater and Wilbur (1997), “Presence is a state of consciousness, the (psychological) sense of being in the virtual environment” (p. 605). From a psychological perspective, this acknowledgement is an advance, but the current theoretical models keep contemplating the sense of presence as a direct function of the immersion capacity of the system. Usually, the variables form the person are not taking into account.
Most of the current definitional proposals about presence are mainly focused on one part of the binomial considered by Slater (2003), and they give a central role to the medium. Examples can be found in the six conceptualisations existing in the literature reviewed by Lombard and Ditton (1997). In the same way, even recognising the role of the human processing, the Lombard and Ditton’s proposal about “the perceptual illusion of non mediation” is also centred on the medium, by speaking about non mediation. Finally, Steuer (1992) insisted on the inadequacy of a VR definition focused on technological aspects and defended the convenience of speaking of a human experience. However, he has been also focused on the analysis of the factors of the system (vividness and interactivity) that have an influence on that human experience. Nevertheless, it can be a mistake to assume a lineal relation between presence and immersion. As Schubert et al. (2001) point out, a series of cognitive processes mediate the effect of the degree of immersion in producing presence in the user.
Our intention is not to forget the other part of the binomial, that is, immersion (using Slater’s terminology). The technology is important and we do not pretend to under value it at all. But are the technological aspects sufficient to achieve the sense of presence? We do not think so. In this work we are going to defend the convenience of considering psychological aspects if we want to progress in the field of VR and, specifically, in the ambit of presence. We will defend the following thesis: 1) The need of a psychological theory of presence in the field of VR; 2) the need of taking into account other psychological aspects in addition to presence. At least for some applications it is necessary to consider concepts such as consciousness, reality judgement, memory, attention, meaning of the experience, emotions, personality dimensions, etc. In this work, we analyse briefly the importance of the consciousness and reality judgement.
Before considering the concept of presence, it could be useful to remember the notion of consciousness. Consciousness has been obviated or undervalued in most of the approaches on presence (e.g., Slater, 2003), while it has practically been identified to presence in others (Waterwoth and Waterworth, 2003; Riva and Waterworth, 2003).
When there is a talk about presence in VR, it does not refer to the presence experienced by a rat or a monkey, but by a human being, that is, a special organism. This organism has a system to perceive the world (using Lorenz’s terminology, 1974) which contains, on one hand, all the information stored by its filum in the genome during aeons of evolution and, on the other, it is open to the whole cultural inheritance accumulated by its fellows during millenniums. The man is an animal of realities (Pinillos, 1975), and the technological progress has created the possibility of establishing new realities, the virtual worlds. But we shouldn’t forget the other realities that enable consciousness. Or said in other way, we have to take into account how a human being represents and values “real” worlds, if we want to have a better knowledge of how represents or values the virtual “worlds”. Maybe the differences are not so many because our reality is already virtual (Tart, 1990).
However, we shouldn’t confuse concepts. One thing is consciousness and, another very different is presence. Briefly exposed, a human being need to be a self that recognises itself in a personal identity and, therefore, endowed with consciousness to experience presence. But, self, personal identity, and consciousness are not presence. All of them are more complex and wide concepts than the concept of presence. It is not the same the sense of being, and the fact of recognising oneself as a self, than the sense of being there. It is no the same to affirm that I am a human being, than to affirm that I am here or there. In short, consciousness is a prerequisite to experience presence and it cannot be ignored all this implies, but consciousness is inexcusable to approach any cognitive process or mental activity in general. Consciousness and presence correspond to different levels of analysis.
The simplest and most common conceptualisation of presence is the illusion of being there, whether ‘there’ exists in the physical space or not (Biocca, 1997). As it has been mentioned before, usually medium has been over-emphasized. For instance, according to the definition as “the perceptual illusion of non mediation” (Lombard & Ditton, 1997), ‘presence’ cannot occur unless the person uses a medium. In our view, ‘the perceptual illusion of non mediation’ is just an illusion. All our experiences are mediated. They can be technologically mediated, biologically mediated, psychologically mediated, or sociologically mediated. The perception does not imply a mere copy of reality, it is a constructive process by which we interpret the sensory data, and in such process an interaction between sensory and conceptual processes is produced (Neisser, 1981). Information processing is not only guided by ‘data’, but also and in a very important way by our judgements, expectations, concepts and so on.
In the VR field, it is common to talk on presence in relation to an environment ‘generated by a computer’, but at the same time is common to think of the ‘perfection’ of the sense of presence if the person is in the ‘real world’. The point is that we can be many times in different worlds (or we live different experiences) in the 'real’ world. As we have pointed out, the reality is constructed and it is done by a particular brain. For this reason, we believe that focusing in the medium is important, but insufficient. It is also needed to underline the aspect of human experience, that is the feeling of being there. Wherever we are, we are always present, but the place where we feel present could vary (with different degrees of consciousness). The sense of presence can fluctuate between the three poles described by Biocca (1997, 2003). Also, in the real world, the sense of presence could also vary, and we do not experience always a higher sense of presence in the real world than in the virtual world. We should abandon the dichotomy real versus virtual and start talking about “different experiences in different worlds” (or different realities). The point is that experiencing presence is not a controlled process but automatic, and outside of conscious awareness. Presence is not usually a reflexive act of which persons are conscious of. In fact, we are only conscious of it when we ‘become absent minded’, or better said, when we ‘come back from our absent mind’.
We think that, at this moment, it is only possible to offer an working proposal, in order to guide the future research. Very elaborated definitions that try to capture the ‘essence’ of what is presence could be premature at this moment and can prejudice us more than help us. As a first approach we state that presence is a human experience, a mental representation of a space (space-temporary context) where the self is placed. Presence is a multidimensional construct and, thereby, many factors need to be studied (referred to the media, to the context, to the task and the virtual environment, to the person that is using the system, and to the external world). Presence will be the result of the interaction between all these factors. Therefore, it will vary across individuals and also in the same individual across different moments. Depending on the objective to be achieved, some factors could be more important that another ones.
In order to understand our mental representations in the virtual worlds, it is important to know how mental representations of our daily experiences in the ‘real’ world are generated. In the same way, it is important to underlie the central role that the self is playing in the process. That is, the fact that the self is the agent of the experience. An individual will attend to what is important to his/her self. This issue outlines the importance of the meaning, and the importance of emotions. I will attend a particular stimulus if I consider it interesting or dangerous; or I will not do it if I think it is irrelevant or boring. I will elaborate and keep attending it or I will stop doing it. Moreover, the relations could not be lineal, sometimes something can be so terrible for me that I find it impossible to accept and a dissociation is produced. Finally, it is needed to taking into account the mood state and the stable emotional dispositions that characterises the individual. In short, if we think that presence is a human experience, there are psychological variables that are important to the VR field, and we think we have to study these variables in the future. By the moment, we have considered the importance of emotions (Alcañiz et al., 2003) and the reality judgement (Baños et al., 1999; 2000).
In the VR arena, the term of presence has been recognised as central and played an importante role in congresses, scientific meetings, journals and even specific research projects. However, the term “reality” has been usually slurred and forgotten. But the “attribution of reality” could be an important phenomenon in this field. “Reality judgement” and the “feeling of being there” are two closely related concepts but are not the same (e.g., I can be there, but this is not real; or that is real but I am not there, I am here). Each of these two factors can be more or less important depending on the kind of applications we are interested in. In fact, there are two very important questions in this context: How do we convince the users that they are in the virtual world? And, how do we convince them that such a world is real? (Baños, et al. 1999).
In the context of virtual worlds, a very useful concept is “willing suspension of disbelief” or the willingness to interpret virtual experiences as if were veridical. This can be important in the VR applications to mental health, in which our interest is that the user feels there and judges as real the experience we present to him/her. It is like games, “they may simulate events in nature or events in society, but this is not why they are played. They are played because they create their own reality, which participants find enforcing” (Brickman, 1978. p.25). Games work only if people feel that they are real. We think that the VR in mental health works in part because participants feel that the environment is real (Baños et al.,1999). A person may think that something is real and, nevertheless, not feeling present as it happens when watching and listening news on TV. It is also possible to think of experiences in which individuals feel themselves very present, but they do not give them reality judgement, as when they are enjoying a virtual adventure in Orlando. In the same way, not all the applications need both components in the same extent (e.g. in VE designed to give an active distraction to burned patients it is necessary a high degree of presence, but it may not be necessary a high degree of reality judgement; however, in VE designed to treat phobias, both variables could be necessary).
Which factors of VR contribute to experience reality judgement? Brickman (1978) states a quite operative proposal. In his opinion, an experience is considered real to the extent that holds internal and external correspondence. Internal correspondence refers to the correspondence of behaviour with feelings. That is, a situation is considered as real in part when there is a good deal of emotion in the situation. External correspondence means that behaviour corresponds with consequences. That is, the person’s behaviour determines and corresponds to important consequences in the world. The importance of these factors can be exemplified in the plot of the film The Game. As more consequences are produced and these are more important and have a major emotional impact, the game stops being considered as a game and turns into something very real.
The topic of reality judgement is difficult, but it could be very useful in the VR field. To study “reality attributions” could help us 1) to understand presence; 2) to improve the efficacy of some VR applications (especially for mental health); 3) to understand some psychological disorders as hallucinations and delusions (Baños et al 1999). Furthermore, at this moment the most frequently used questionnaires to assess presence contain items referred to reality judgment and some empirical studies (using factor analyses) have found factors related to reality attribution. (Baños et al., 2000; Lessiter, Freeman, Keogh & Davidoff, 2000; Schubert et al, 2001). Finally, this topic is also needed from an ethical perspective. Currently, the practical totality of our experiences come from the ‘real world’, but the children of future are going to be familiarised with the virtual worlds. Maybe those children used to having multiple virtual experiences might have problems with regard to their personal identity, due to aspects of presence and reality judgement. Did I live this at school?, did I live this in a virtual reality system? Or did I just dream about it?
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